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The Postwar Situation 
Although most people involved did not realize it at the time, a great disappoint-
ment was in störe for those who had expected that, after the defeat of Germany, 
the over-all conditions and climate of the First Republic (1918—1938) would 
be restored in Czechoslovakia. For while nominally a victorious State, the country 
became part of the Soviet sphere of influence. 
Compared with neighbors sharing this geopolitical State of affairs, those poli-
tically active in Czechoslovakia appear to have been very ill-prepared for such 
a State of affairs. In contrast, for instance, to the Poles and Hungarians, many 
Czechs and Slovaks harbored pro-Russian or pan-Slavist feelings, generated by 
traditional national mythology and assisted by the circumstance that, before 
1945, the Czechs and Slovaks had never been Russia's direct neighbors. The ear-
lier warnings against Russian autocracy from such prominent thinkers as Karel 
Havlíček and Thomas Masaryk were forgotten in the exhilarating times of libe-
ration from Hitler-German domination and the re-establishment of Czechoslova­
kia. Even the fact that the USSR had actually annexed by force the easternmost 
tip of Czechoslovakia (Ruthenia, known as the Subcarpathian Russia before the 
war) was not held against the liberators in Prague. The presence of Soviet soldiers, 
in particular of Marshai Malinovsky's army in Slovakia and southern Moravia, 
did have a sobering effect, but even their behavior failed to penetrate national 
consciousness. All that was forgotten soon after Soviet troops withdrew from 
Czechoslovakia toward the end of 1945. 
The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which, before the Second World War, 
had managed to attract about 10 per cent of the electorate, increased its vote to 
38 per cent in the 1946 elections. Inevitably, many of its new members were op-
portunists, seeking privilege and sensing from where the postwar winds were 
blowing. Many others, however, particularly those who were then in their 20s, 
sincerely believed that communism was a short cut to a better, more equitable way 
of life. Furthermore, the communist cause was aided by a very unstable Situation, 
particularly in Bohemia and Moravia, exacerbated by the mass expulsion of Citizens 
of German origin, and the divisions and weakness of the democratic political par­
ties and cultural groups. 
At least two major factors played a role in facilitating the easy leftist take-
over of late February 1948. The first was the objectively existing revolutionary 
Situation, in particular in Bohemia and Moravia. Apart from presidential decrees, the 
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establishment of national committees on regional, district and local levels, many 
of them controlled by communists and arbitrary bureaucratic decisions such as 
confiscations of properties side by side with legal „nationalizations," it was mainly 
the expulsion of Germans which created a vacuum filled largely by elements be-
lieving in communist promises of redistribution of land, elements which were 
keen to achieve or support an over-all revolutionary restructuralization of society. 
More than three million Czechoslovak Citizens of German ethnic origin were ex-
pelled or could not return to their native land; their places were initially taken 
over largely by uprooted or migrant elements keen to achieve fast economic suc-
cess. The rule of law could hardly be reinstated in this social upsurge. 
The other, equally important element was the inefficiency of the non-com-
munist political and cultural leadership which was not up to the exacting post-
war Situation. As if stunned by the sudden Soviet proximity, the majority of 
prominent politicians, writers and journalists, who belonged to the non-commu-
nist parties or who were of a democratic-humanitarian political allegiance, failed 
to oppose the communists on basic political principles, effectively and persuasi-
vely. Moreover, their own support of actions such as the confiscatory nationali­
zations, the haphazard establishment of the national committees, the expulsion 
of the Sudeten Germans, „people's democratic legislation," et. al., helped to 
bring about the very revolutionary Situation from which the communists were 
bound to profit. Instead of organizing their own adherents and voters — after 
all they represented more than 60 per cent of the adult Czechoslovak population 
— they trusted old and ailing President Edvard Beneš, mistakenly hoping that, 
in the moment of crisis, he would savé them by his own constitutional power and 
populär prestige. 
Thus, when the moment of truth came in the week preceding 25 February 1948 
the communist party, aided by its newly established People's Militia, was able 
to také over the statě and all its institutions without a shot being fired. In com­
munist literatuře the February 1948 coup became the model for a „peaceful 
transition to socialism" achieved by the application of „pressure from above and 
below". The army — under the command of Minister of Defense General Ludvík 
Svoboda — remained neutral; the political, economic, cultural, and propaganda 
institutions of power were taken over by communists, the non-communist parties 
by sympathizers and prominent anticommunists were forced to flee the country 
or face arrest. For the young communists it seemed as though a bright future was 
about to dawn. 
The post-1948 Purges: „Enemies" Outside and Inside the Party 
The seemingly auspicious constellation for a Czechoslovak road to socialism, as 
promised by party leader Klement Gottwald, did not last for long, however. 
Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform with its accompanying witch hunt 
against „Titoism", the Soviet decision to support the Arabs rather than Israel in 
the Middle East and the anti-Zionism, which went with it, Stalin's increasing 
persecution of imaginary enemies and, finally, the beginning of the Korean war 
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drastically changed the status within the Soviet-dominated socialist camp. The 
seeds of mistrust of one's fellows, sown in the Soviet Union, found fertile ground 
in Czechoslovakia. 
From 1949 onwards, the nationalization of the means of production and di-
stribution and the collectivization of land and farms was applauded at every 
stage, by many who had not yet been affected. Services and small repair shops 
suffered the same fate as factories and larger enterprises had earlier. This whole-
sale application of the Marxist concept of equality, however, went hand in hand 
with a tremendous inequality in the distribution of power — immense power, 
albeit insecure, in the hands of a few as against a loss of self-determination on 
the part of the overwhelming majority. Such a regime could remain effective only 
by means of repression. 
The first to suffer after February 1948 were those active anticommunists who 
had remained in the country, ranging from the jailed and later sentenced Minister 
of Justice, Prokop Drtina, down to thousands of students throughout the coun­
try who were expelled from their university departments. On the economic level, 
large enterprises and businesses had been nationalized in 1945 by presidential de-
cree. After the coup factories with more than 50 employees were nationalized 
without delay. Mediumsized business and service companies were then expropria-
ted, a process accompanied by massive and sustained propaganda from the com-
munist-controlled mass media. Finally, small retail shops and servicing outfits, and 
medium- and small-scale farms were also nationalized. Old social structures were 
forcibly distrupted, old patterns of life and habits overturned, and what emerged 
was a totalitarian statě. 
The scale of the purges, imprisonment, and executions during the Stalinist era 
(1949—1953) in Czechoslovakia is not usually realized in the West. According 
to information which became available during the Prague Spring, some 120 000 to 
130 000 people were imprisoned, sentenced, arbitrarily detained, or sent to labor 
camps — the most notorious being the now abandoned uranium mineš near Joa-
chimsthal (Jáchymov) in western Bohemia — at the fiat of their respective national 
committees. The extent of police repression then can be put into perspective only 
if one realizes that, for varying periods of time, fully 1 per cent of the total 
Czechoslovak population was in prison or interned in forced labor camps. As a 
result of sentences by statě courts 178 Citizens were executed for political reasons, 
a figuře which does not include the undisclosed sentences handed down at secret 
trials, and, according to conservative estimates, a further 8 000 people who died 
in prisons or labor camps. 
The overwhelming majority of those persecuted after the communist takeover 
and in the early 1950s were of democratic or anticommunist persuasion: active 
supporters of the former non-communist parties of the National Front, members 
of the upper and middle classes, „kulaks" who opposed the collectivization of 
their properties, former soldiers and airmen who had served with Western or 
even with Eastern forces, and, generally speaking, any individual deemed „guilty" 
of having departed in any way from the new social norm. Yet the Stalinist lea-
ders of the Czechoslowak and Soviet parties were not content with persecuting 
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real or assumed opponents. Too many things were going wrong, and the party 
and the country had to be presented with scapegoats of a higher order; it had to 
be molded into something which even Stalin would accept from a loyal ally on 
the Soviet Union's western border. 
It did not take long, therefore, before the communist party also began to seek 
the enemy within its own ranks. Right from the beginning, those communists were 
suspect who had had links with the West, for instance, those who had spent 
World War II in Western countries or armies, former members of the Spanish In­
ternational Brigades, people of Jewish origin, in effect anyone who might be 
presumed to have internationalist, „cosmopolitan" leanings, or not to be enthusia-
stic about submitting himself totally and unconditionally to Soviet domination. 
As for the so-called Slánský trial, this began with the arrest of several promi­
nent suspects as early as 1949, the best known of whom was the then Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Trade Eugen Loebl. I t had developed into the arrest of an 
entire „antistate conspiratorial center" by 1950—1951, culminating symbolically 
in the trial of 14 prominent Communists headed by the former Secretary-General 
of the CPCS, Rudolf Slánský, in November 1952 and the execution of 11 of 
them on 3 December 1952. It dragged on into 1954, ending a year after the almost 
simultaneous deaths of Stalin and Gottwald. It would be a mistake to believe 
that key politicians like Slánský, Clementis, Reicin, Frank, Šváb, Geminder, or 
Loebl were the only victims. The purge affected a number of regional and district 
communist officials, primarily those of Jewish origin, and spread far into the 
ranks of the „cosmopolitan" communist intelligentsia, many of whom were sen­
tenced to life or long terms of imprisonment, to be prematurely released between 
1955 and 1960 and subsequently rehabilitated. 
The Slánský trial and the related court proceedings are a classic example of 
the old dictum „divide and rule". With remarkable consistency the top party 
leadership succeeded in presenting to the party rank and file and to the whole 
nation culprits, accused of the sins of Titoism, Zionism, pro-Western espionage, 
etc., in a manner which made many people of good will believe, for a time, that 
these conspirators were indeed responsible for the various ills of the country. A 
continuous stream of centrally directed propaganda systematically revived old 
prejudices, such as those against Jews, „capitalist" origins, or German ethnic 
backgrounds, and turned them against the accused, promising that the millennium 
would be at hand once this so-called web of conspiracy had been eliminated. In-
cidentally, several of those who participated more or less actively in the mass 
hysteria of the early 1950s later sought atonement in active engagement in the 
Prague Spring. 
From Vacillation to Reform 
Stalin's and Gottwalďs deaths were followed by an understandable period of 
hesitation. At first, under the party leadership of Antonín Novotný, some major 
trials were held as scheduled, though the repression began to let up (for instance, 
Gustav Husák was sentenced to life imprisonment in April 1954, to be released 
in 1960). It was apparent that Novotný, a skilled party machine politician, feit 
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unsure as to the direction Soviet policies were going to také. This, to 
be sure, was by no means peculiar to Czechoslovakia: there was wi-
despread uncertainty throughout Eastern Europe during the early post-Stalin 
phase about Soviet intentions. Such hopeful developments in the USSR as the 
various „New Course" concessions and the „thaw" provided no real clue. They 
were more a response to the abuses of the Stalin era than an indication of any 
fundamental rethinking as to how Eastern Europe should be ruled. No further 
developments were likely so long as divisions within the Soviet leadership preclu-
ded the emergence of a leader of unchallenged stature. 
During these years one could sense behind the scenes in Czechoslovakia the first 
stirrings of pressure for the reversal of the verdicts of some of the more outra-
geous trials, tentative attempts to increase the hitherto severely restricted free­
dom of expression, and the beginnings of thoughts about the advisability of eco­
nomic reform. But the first watershed came with the 20th CPSU Congress of 
February 1956, which gave an impetus to the reformers. Khrushchev's speech de-
nouncing Stalin in particular could not be ignored by those communists whose 
consciences were troubled or who at least felt uneasy about the years of the great 
purge. Simultaneously, people who were not party members began to see the first 
rays of hope. 
As on other occasions throughout Czech history, writers were the first to 
seize this opportunity. Accepting with enthusiasm their role as the „conscience 
of the nation," they ušed the platform of the Second Czechoslovak Writers' Con­
gress (in April 1956) to make public criticism of the sorry statě of the nation, 
unheard of until then under the communist regime. They were promptly followed 
by the Prague students who ušed the occasion of the „Majáles" celebrations in 
May for a demonstration amounting to a forceful plea for freedom. Sensing the 
imminent danger, the party leadership convened an all-state Conference in June 
1956 designed to normalize the Situation. Novotný clamped down in time and 
managed to keep the country under control at the time of the Hungarian revolu­
tion and the Polish events in the autumn of 1956. 
The reformers were not yet sufficiently organized to be able to act at the cru-
cial moment: in particular they lacked any firm foothold within the upper rea-
ches of the party hierarchy and could not therefore move as a co-ordinated force. 
Novotny's success in keeping Czechoslovakia — the critical link between Poland 
and Hungary — quiet in latě 1956 might well have been the initial basis for his 
long-lasting friendship with Khrushchev. On the other hand, a feeling may well 
have taken root at this time among the intelligentsia that, in spite of temporary 
failure, it would be possible to achieve something once the dead weight of Stalinism 
pure and proper had passed away. 
It is hardly surprising that, in the years that followed, Novotný was disinclined 
to allow any major public reversal of the trials — not to mention any denuncia-
tion of the past on the lineš of Khrushchev's secret speech. He retreated step by 
step, whether over rehabilitations, criticism of the „personality cult," economic 
reform or any loosening of the reins of power, but only to the extent he was for­
ced to by pressure and by the Soviet example. From the point of view of the 
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stability of the systém he must have instinctively felt, rather than intellectually 
grasped, that any withdrawal would tend to invite further pressure and might 
well be seen as a sign of weakness. 
Difficulties and pressures began to build up in the early 1960s; 1961 and 1962 
were years of economic Stagnation, even judged from official figures. In a speech 
to the Central Committee which was at first kept secret Novotný was forced to 
admit this unexpected Stagnation in a socialist country and to announce a cut in 
foreign aid to less developed countries. Ota Šik and his team were advocating 
something approaching a socialist market economy, the creative intelligentsia was 
growing restless, the people were tired of the years of repression and restriction 
and longed for more freedom. Most importantly, some of those feelings began to 
be shared by increasing circles within the upper party hierarchy. 
The thaw, to assume such momentous consequences five years later, began in 
1963. By then, the hard core of the party leadership was no longer able to pre-
vent or Sabotage reforms of substance. Formal rehabilitations were finally announ-
ced, economic expérts were given permission to draft an economic reform program 
for the approval of the party leadership, censorship, especially of literary Journals, 
relaxed noticeably, and tens of thousands (later hundreds of thousands) of people 
were allowed to travel to the West. This last factor was to prove of immeasurable 
importance: the younger generation in particular, submerged by anti-Western and 
anticapitalist propaganda for years, was now able to see for itself, to compare 
the advantages and disadvantages granted their Citizens by open societies with 
those of their own closed systém. 
The cultural thaw, accepted willy-nilly by the vacillating party hierarchy, 
taught people to think and pinpointed the unnecessary restrictions and shortco-
mings in Czechoslovak society. The leaders in this field were the two literary 
weeklies, Literární Noviny in Prague, and Kulturný Život in Bratislava. While 
the first fought a running battle with the authorities, the latter's outspokenness 
was, in fact, protected by Alexander Dubček, who had become Slovák first party 
secretary in April 1963. The cumulative effect of these and related re­
forms, and the populär feelings generated by them, finally led to the 
historie change in the party leadership in early January 1968 and to the pheno-
menon known in the West as the Prague Spring. 
The Crucial Year: Active Forces and Options 
It is hardly necessary to deseribe or even to define the events and experiences 
of the exhilarating year 1968, initiated by the replacement of Antonín Novotný 
by Alexander Dubček as Czechoslovak party leader. Instead, it might be more 
useful to try to distinguish some of the more important forces active in the pro-
cess and outline the options with which the Czechoslovak leadership was con-
fronted. 
To start with the leadership: at the party level, liberalization was inconsistent 
throughout the Prague Spring. To give an example: at the very same CPČS Cen­
tral Committee session of 3—5 January 1968 which elected Dubček party leader 
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and restricted Novotný (provisionally) to his office as President of the Republic, 
four politicians were added to the party Presidium. Symptomatically enough, they 
consisted of two genuine progressives, Josef Špaček and Josef Borůvka, and two 
adaptable conservatives, Jan Piller and Emil Rigo. The same pattern was follo­
wed throughout the eight months of the Prague Spring. Thus, on 4 April 1968, 
the essentially conservative former Editor-in-Chief of Rudé Právo Oldřich 
Švestka was elected — despite the protests of reformers — a member of the party 
Presidium; even more importantly, possibly as a consession to the Soviets, Viliam 
Šalgovič, a notorious police official, was appointed Deputy Minister of the In-
terior with responsibility for statě šecurity on 6 June 1968, a promotion which 
proved disastrous before and in the days immediately following the invasion. 
These personnel policies were by no means haphazard or the result of chance or 
misjudgment. They reflected the compositum of the top party organs, the Presi­
dium, and Secretariat, where a strong conservative minority, nervous about the 
impending changes, sought to brake the urge for reform. Though in a minority at 
the very top, they were supported by important regional and district CP cadres, 
mostly appointed under Novotný if not earlier under Gottwald, who were un-
derstandably worried that the impending 14th party congress scheduled, after 
protracted intraparty disputes, for 9 September 1968 would sweep them out of 
their privileged positions. Thus, although most Czechoslovaks tended to judge 
the party by the agreeable and progressive images of Alexander Dubček, Josef 
Smrkovský or František Kriegel, the far from resolved statě of affairs within 
the upper- and mediumlevel party hierarchy by no means justif ied populär optimism. 
This exhilarating statě of affairs during which, for the first time in Czechoslovak 
history, a great majority of the Czechoslovak people supported — if not identi-
fied with — the communist party leader was, of course, not only a product of 
Dubcek's attractive personality. Populär trust and optimism were nourished mainly 
by two other factors. First, the Czechoslovak media, led by the rádio and televi-
sion and the more intellectual Journals like Reporter, Literární Noviny, and Kul­
turný Život, played a distinctly progressive role. The demise of effective censor­
ship in March (legalized in June) gave an invaluable opportunity to journalists and 
writers to express, for the first time in 20 (if not 30) years, their genuine views 
on domestic affairs. And they ušed this opportunity freely and to good effect, un-
consciously creating the illusion, however, that further progress and democrati-
zation were a one-way street, that nothing and nobody could stop further respon­
sable progress. (The term „responsible" is ušed advisedly, since even the most 
progressive reformers — those communist journalists and writers who actually 
thought like social democrats — were aware of the external limitations of the 
Czechoslovak Situation, did not contemplate a fundamental revision of Czechoslo-
vakia's foreign policy, and did not question the country's membership in Come-
con and the Warsaw Pact.) Sensing increasing freedom in the air, the public did 
not realize that it was witnessing only part of the story, námely the progressive, 
reformist efforts. It was not able to perceive that, at the same time, Dubček was 
exposed to strong conservative or reactionary pressures from within the party 
apparat, and increasingly so also from the socialist camp. 
22 
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The second misconception is of a similar nature. In those buoyant months the 
possibility of Soviet armed intervention does not seem to have penetrated to the 
level of serious public awareness. If some individuals working in the media did 
contemplate it, they would not speak of it publicly. And though many — refor-
mists in high party or government positions included — must inwardly have been 
concerned about this danger, the wave of mass enthusiasm led most to turn a 
blind eye to it. Everyone behaved as if he believed that Czechoslovak internal 
affairs, be it the incipient political and economic reforms or what came close to 
the freedom of public expression and information, were the exclusive domain of 
the Czechoslovak authorities. At least in this respect the Czechs and Slovaks 
maneuvered themselves into judging the Soviet Union by its proclaimed Marxist-
Leninist ideology and not as an imperialist power afraid of potential infection 
from within the socialist camp; they took verbal assurances at their face value 
and did not try to see them as a convenient tactical mask. More importantly, this 
basic error was shared by the Czechoslovak party and governmental leaders. The 
utter surprise, dismay and disillusion of Dubček and his colleagues in the hours 
following the invasion are sufficient testimony. 
It is now widely agreed that, in essence, the Czechoslovak reformers in 1968 had 
the choice of two courses of action other than the one they actually took. One 
possibility would have been to apply the brakes to the reforms. Their party action 
program published in April 1968 would have to be more moderate, their plans 
for economic reform including workers' co-determination more subdued, censor-
ship of the mass media should not have been abolished, even though it could have 
been handled somewhat more intelligently and occasionally less restrictively than 
under Novotný. Alternatively they should have convened the 14th CPČS Con-
gress swiftly, for May or June 1968, to change the top cadres and „legalize" the 
reform before the Soviets had time to decide upon and organize armed interven­
tion. 
The first course might have been successful to the extent that the party pro­
gressives and the population at large would have had to be satisfied with some­
thing approaching the present Hungarian model. Since, after years of the priva-
tions of Stalinism, this was hardly conceivable by way of national selfdiscipline, 
such a decision would have actually meant rule by someone slightly more liberal 
but also more consistent than Novotný. It would have meant accepting a very 
slow, inconspicuous, uninspiring reform of a rigid, closed society, in other words, 
a more intelligent and more purposeful Antonín Novotný. 
The other option would have probably required a more energetic and ruthless 
party leader than Alexander Dubček. It would have involved the speedy elimina-
tion of dogmatic pro-Soviet elements in the top hierarchy, the election of a new 
Central Committee by a promptly convoked congress, and subsequent elimina-
tion of the dogmatists from key party offices in the regions and districts. All this 
would probably have been feasible on the wave of national elation in the spring 
or early summer of 1968. It would also have meant, however, making it clear to 
any potential aggressor that Czechoslovakia was resolved to defend its territorial 
integrity. It would have to have been based on the assumption that, if confron-
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ted with the likelihood of an armed conflict in the heart of Europe and on the 
West German border, the Soviet Union would desist from an armed attack and 
resort to other means of pressure. It would, no doubt, have been a policy invol­
ving considerable risks, but which might have been worth the effort. Was the in-
vasion worthwhile for the Soviet leadership? In the short term it did quell a highly 
dangerous potential source of disruptive ideological contagion in Eastern Europe. 
On the longer-term political side, however, the invasion harmed the Soviet 
Union considerably, not least among Western communist parties. The concept of 
Eurocommunism is ideologically partly based on the ideas and experiences of the 
Prague Spring. And, nearly 10 years after the invasion, Western communist Oppo­
sition to this action not only seems to be undiminished, but appears to have be­
come regarded as a Soviet sin not to be forgotten and to be corrected in the pro-
grams of some Western communist parties. 
On balance, the invasion would seem to have been of advantage to the Soviet 
Union only if seen from the point of view of longer term military stratégy, what-
ever that is worth nowadays, and shorter term ideological security, or through 
the prism of Stalinism according to the dictum „socialism is where the Soviet 
Army Stands". Judged by other criteria, the balance must remain negative. The 
more so since the Soviet leadership did not seem to realize at the time that, first, 
strong economic pressure might have sufficed to turn the events, and secondly, it 
could be argued that the Prague Spring might have run into trouble of its own 
accord owing to a Substantive conflict of interests which would have become 
inevitable in due course: stated in the simplest terms, regardless of party affilia-
tion, those believing in the leading role of the party would have clashed with 
groups advocating pluralism and genuine democratization. The Soviet Union may 
well have been unduly hasty after all. 
Stagnation After Re-Sovietization. What Now? 
The almost ten years of so-called normalization under CPČS Secretary-General 
Gustav Husák have been singularly unproductive and duli. A „Biafra of the 
Spirit" on the intellectual and creative side, the country has been kept going eco-
nomically at its accustomed level partly by hábit, partly thanks to the fact that, 
before the invasion, Czechoslovakia had had a strongly positive belance of pay-
ments with Comecon countries and, in addition, appears to have been the recipient 
of a sizable Soviet credit extended partly in Western currencies. Thus, the apa-
thetic and newly repressed population plodded on in relatively good economic 
conditions. This generál statě of affairs has occasionally obscured the fact that, 
given the outdated technological level of many factories, the overcentralized bu-
reaucratic structure, and the inevitably worsening terms of trade, and the depar-
ture or eviction from the party (often with loss of job) of about 500 000 members, 
with thousands of qualified directors and managers dismissed for political rea-
sons, the apparent normality of economic life and society in generál could be no 
more than temporary and deceptive. 
In some areas of life recent years have even been somewhat reminiscent of the 
22« 
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early 1950s. This was the čase, for instance, with culture — with the significant 
difference that, a quarter of a Century ago, the party had at its disposal a num-
ber of talented writers and artists, whose places nowadays are largely occupied 
by mediocrities. This was also true in the sphere of agitprop, where the ghost of 
Stalinism keeps on reappearing, no matter how discredited it had become (inci-
dentally, this is why so many people now again merely glance through the head-
lines and devote themselves principally to the sports page). In other sectors, for 
instance in economic policies and controls, the regime returned more or less to 
the prereform period, as if oblivious of the fact that substantial structural re­
forms would have to be implemented, modernization of the means of production 
given a stronger impetus, and greater incentives given to the working population. 
This return to the Novotný-ite economic policies of the late 1950s or early 1960s 
is now beginning to exact its price: the drastically increasing costs of Soviet raw 
materials, oil in particular, and the inability of Czechoslovakia to compete suc-
cessfully on Western markets with its industrial products are beginning to threa-
ten living Standards. 
Not even the one real achievement of the reform period to survive the fateful 
year of 1968 — federalization of the Republic — can change the over-all bleak 
picture. The historie importance (and future potential) of federalization should 
certainly not be underestimated, but the integrationist and recentralizing policy 
imposed on State and party spheres since the early 1970s has left it at present 
with rather more relevance as a juridical theory than substance in everyday 
practice. 
As a result of all these developments, in which most Czechoslovaks played a 
passive rather than an active role, the majority are nowadays politically apathe-
tic. They are concerned with the materiál side of life as defined by the not too 
opulent limits of Soviet-type socialism. To a considerable extent, this somewhat 
materialistic outlook is a result not only of their disadvantageous geographical 
Position, but also of the lack of principled and decisive action on the part of their 
ruling elites at crucial times. The people — with minor but significant exceptions 
— have been relegated to the role of passive witnesses or victims of decisions taken 
elsewhere and developments oceurring without their active participation. 
It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, the politically aware and 
active sections of the population are divided. Although on the face of it the human 
rights movement Charter 77 can be seen as an over-all concept unifying the for-
ces of political Opposition, in fact views on the most effective means of political 
action are known to differ. There are some who would like to demonstrate to 
the world that the spirit of Opposition to the stultifying regime of Gustav Husák 
is not dead, that individuals who can be regarded as genuine representatives of 
the people are prepared to take considerable risks for the ideal of establishing a 
humanitarian, demoeratie regime. There are others operating under the Charter 
banner, however, who favor a strictly legalistic and cautious approach (Charter 
spokesman Jiří Hájek, for example). There are also those political opponents 
outside the Charter movement (predominantly ex-communists) for whom the 
Prague Spring remains a model of political Organization, as well as those who, 
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after pertinent experience, reject anything smacking of communism. Differences 
of approach among writers are also very considerable. Some writers always were 
or became wholehearted and unhesitating collaborators with the regime (e. g., 
Jan Kozák or Donát Šajner). Others, like Ladislav Fuks or Bohumil Hrabal, 
occupy uneasy positions in between, some of them using their membership of the 
Writers' Union to try and help those who have been banned. Finally, there are 
prominent writers and dramatists, such as Václav Havel, Pavel Kohout, and 
Ludvík Vaculík, who have adopted a strictly moral stance and refuse to co-operate 
with the current regime altogether, while the authorities have doně and are doing 
their best to expel them from the socialist Community. 
The differences are, of course, much narrower among those bearing political 
responsibility. They are hamstrung by the country's geopolitical position, by So­
viet suspicions aroused by the Prague Spring, and by Czechoslovakia's democratic 
and pro-Western political traditions; they are hampered by their own past poli­
tical convolutions, by the opportunism they exhibited in various situations, by 
their own previous appointments within the party and in leading economic posi­
tions which they would now like to retract but cannot. There are, for instance, 
the many hundreds of directors and deputy directors of enterprises and State or-
ganizations who, despite lacking the necessary qualifications, were elevated in the 
purge of the early 1970s; no doubt some sectíons of the party leadership would 
prcfer to exchange them for those more able and qualified men who were ousted 
for political reasons. It would be difficult to do so, however, since the new cadres 
appointed out of political expediency would, in the case of dismissal, have to be 
given posts of equal standing which are just not available. Thus, the Czechoslovak 
leadership's room for maneuver is narrow. 
After the August 1968 invasion and the April 1969 takeover by Husák there 
were hopes within Czechoslovakia and among Western experts that, after an in­
terregnum of a few years and the calming of passions, Czechoslovakia would be 
able to follow the Hungarian example, that the totalitarian regime could be repla-
ced by a milder authoritarian variant which would recognize the desires and needs 
of present-day society. Gustav Husák and his team have failed to achieve this. 
Instead of aiming in that direction they have taken decisions, made appointments, 
and controlled society in such a way that any genuine liberalization has been 
made increasingly difficult. 
In so doing they were, of course, in tune with the mood of the Brezhnev era, 
which has hardly been conducive to such hopes. There are few who would doubt 
Husak's ability or deny him certain personal qualities such as courage. But over 
the last decade his essential political conservatism has interacted unhappily with 
his undoubted political ambition. He was nevěr a real reformer and, in nearly 
ten years, blocked not only by the suspicious Soviet gerontocracy but no less 
effectively by his own colleagues in the party Presidium and Secretariat, Husák 
has offered little more than political immobilism. How strong his resolve is to 
continue indefinitely in increasingly frustrating circumstances as both party lea­
der and President of the Republic is hard to teil, but he is 65, reputedly not very 
healthy, and has just suffered the shock of losing his wife in a tragic accident. 
341 
He was, moreover, reportedly openly attadked before the last CC plenům. A 
rather disparate faction is allegedly forming itself in an attempt to get him repla-
ced as party secretary-general, leaving him with the office of President of the 
Republic. Up to now Husák has managed to repel this attack, getting rid of his 
most vociferous critic, the south Bohemian leading party secretary Jaroslav Hejna, 
by sending him as ambassador to Sofia. However, more powerful politicians, 
younger than himself, are waiting in the wings. In the first place it may well be 
Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal who would feel able and fit enough for the post; 
but this is hardly less true of Alois Indra, Antonín Kapek, or even Vasil BiTak, 
all of whom may well be dissatisfied with Husak's increasingly ineffecraal per­
formance. 
The prospects for Husak's successor, whoever he may be, could be brighter than 
for Husák. Given the basically opportunistic traits of the current party leadership, 
even a pro-Soviet fundamentalist might be in a better position to achieve some 
elleviation, should he wish to do so, than Husák himself: at least he 
would not be blocked to near impotence by „leftists" in the party Presidium and 
Secretariat. Be that as it may, it must be remembered that, at least partly as a 
result of Czechoslovakia's particular convolutions and mismanagement in recent 
history, the room for maneuver is likely to remain rather restricted in the near 
future. 
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